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THE CORONAVIRUS PANDEMIC SHUTDOWN
AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE: WHY COURTS
SHOULD REFOCUS THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
TAKINGS ANALYSIS
Timothy M. Harris*
The 2020 Coronavirus Pandemic and the ensuing shutdown of
private businesses—to promote the public’s health and safety—
demonstrated the wide reach of state and local governments’ police
power. Many businesses closed and many went bankrupt as various
government programs failed to keep their enterprises afloat.
These businesses were shut down to further the national interest
in stemming a global pandemic. This is an archetypal example of
regulating for the public health—preventing a direct threat that sickened
hundreds of thousands of Americans. But some businesses were
disproportionately hit while others flourished. Many who bore the brunt
of these regulations sued, alleging their property was taken by the
government without just compensation. These unfortunate businesses
and individuals are unlikely to be successful, absent arbitrary action by
the government, a physical invasion, or other egregious circumstances.
The Takings Clause is therefore woefully inadequate to provide
what Aristotle called “distributive justice”—the equal distribution of
benefits and burdens throughout society. Courts should therefore refocus
the takings analysis to ensure fairness and justice by considering whether
a regulation has a disproportionate, catastrophic, and sudden impact.

* Adjunct Professor of Law, Seattle University School of Law. B.A., M.A. University of
California, Davis. J.D. University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law. © 2020.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The 2020 Coronavirus/Covid-19 pandemic shutdown—in which
state and local governments closed thriving businesses to stem the
spread of disease—disproportionately affected those business owners
whose livelihoods depend on human contact. Hair salons, restaurants,
bars, and movie theaters were shuttered,1 while grocery stores, home
office suppliers, and technology companies flourished.2 Those human
contact businesses carried a lopsided societal burden through no fault
of their own.
Many affected businesses sued under the Fifth Amendment’s
Takings Clause: “nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.”3 Although the plain language of the
Takings Clause would seem to create a viable cause of action, courtcreated exceptions for health and safety regulations—coupled with the
temporary nature of the pandemic shutdown—left these businesses
without judicial relief.
The lack of viable takings claims for these disproportionately
affected businesses highlight the inequities of the Fifth Amendment
takings analysis. According to the U.S. Supreme Court, the Takings
Clause was designed to prevent individuals from bearing burdens,
“which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
whole.”4 But the cases and judicially-created balancing tests do not
reflect that outcome. Courts should, therefore, refocus and widen the
applicability of takings claims to include relief for entities that have
been suddenly and catastrophically hit by unexpected regulations.

1. See, e.g., Michael McGough, Coronavirus Updates: In California’s New Reopening Plan,
When Can Bars, Theaters Reopen?, SACRAMENTO BEE (Sept. 2, 2020, 9:01 AM), https://www.sa
cbee.com/news/coronavirus/article245433100.html (discussing the closing and reopening of bars,
restaurants, hair salons and card rooms).
2. See, e.g., David J. Lynch, In a Bleak Economy, These Companies Are Flourishing, WASH.
POST (Aug. 11, 2020, 10:40 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/08/10/recessi
on-coronavirus-pandemic-winners/; Mike Duff, Home Office Lifestyle Trends Accelerated as
Pandemic Spread, HOMEWORLD BUS. (Sept. 16, 2020), https://www.homeworldbusiness.com/ho
me-office-lifestyle-trends-accelerated-as-pandemic-spread-2/
[https://web.archive.org/web/20201214181237/https://www.homeworldbusiness.com/homeoffice-lifestyle-trends-accelerated-as-pandemic-spread-2/] (“The home and small office furniture
segment is going through a metamorphosis of sorts, one that has been accelerated by the
coronavirus pandemic in the U.S. . . . .”).
3. U.S. CONST. amend V.
4. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123–24 (1978) (quoting
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
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II. BACKGROUND
In December of 2019, a novel coronavirus began infecting
humans and quickly spread in Wuhan, China.5 The World Health
Organization (WHO) declared a global pandemic on March 11, 2020,
after the virus spread to 114 countries and had killed more than 4,000
people.6 The first confirmed case in the United States was on
January 21, 2020.7 The virus subsequently spread across several
regions of the United States,8 and on January 30, the WHO declared a
global health emergency.9 The United States reported its first
coronavirus death on February 29, 2020, and on March 13, President
Trump declared a National Emergency.10 By March 26, 2020, the
United States led the world in coronavirus cases.11 The pandemic
continued through the summer. At the end of September 2020, more
than two hundred thousand died of coronavirus-related illness in the
United States, and the total number of cases approached seven
million.12
In March of 2020, governors of forty-five states implemented a
“patchwork of policies,” including full or partial closure of bars,
restaurants, and other non-essential services in response to the global
coronavirus pandemic.13 The government’s closure of otherwise
profitable enterprises created catastrophic losses for many business
owners and their employees.14 These closures continued for several
5. Derrick Bryson Taylor, A Timeline of the Coronavirus Pandemic, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/article/coronavirus-timeline.html.
6. Tedros Adhanom, WHO Dir.-Gen., Opening Remarks at the Media Briefing on COVID19 (Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.who.int/dg/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-openingremarks-at-the-media-briefing-on-covid-19---11-march-2020/.
7. Taylor, supra note 5.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Jeffrey Kluger, Tragic Math: The U.S. Exceeds 200,000 COVID-19 Deaths, TIME
(Sept. 22, 2020, 11:42 AM), https://time.com/5891101/us-coronavirus-deaths-200000/; Chris
Kidd, US Death Rate Tops 200,000 as Cases Approach 7 Million, EURO WEEKLY NEWS (Sept. 19,
2020, 6:23 PM), https://www.euroweeklynews.com/2020/09/19/us-death-rate-tops-200000-ascases-approach-7-million/.
13. Suzanne Rowan Kelleher, 45 U.S. States Shut Down and Counting: State-by-State Travel
Restrictions, FORBES (Mar. 28, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/suzannerowankelleher/2020/
03/28/23-states-shut-down-and-counting-state-by-state-travel-restrictions/#54a6d5a358f4.
14. See, e.g., Helen Freund, How 6 Months of Pandemic Have Profoundly Changed Florida’s
Restaurants, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Sept. 20, 2020), https://www.tampabay.com/life-culture/food/
2020/09/20/six-months-of-pandemic-have-profoundly-changed-floridas-restaurants/ (stating that
“[a]cross the country about 100,000 restaurants have either closed permanently or long-term” and
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months, with phased re-openings in the late summer and early autumn
of 2020, with mixed success.15
Several businesses and individuals impacted by this government
shutdown sued under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. In
Connecticut, a lounge owner alleged that Governor Lamont’s order
preventing large gatherings and closing restaurants deprived the owner
of all economically viable use of his property and demanded just
compensation under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.16 In
Florida, beachfront property owners alleged that beach patrols by code
compliance officers constituted a physical invasion because they
occupy private property and prevent residents from entering their own
backyards.17 The Florida class-action plaintiffs also argued a
Fourteenth Amendment due process violation, alleging the beach
patrol order was arbitrary and capricious.18
In Colorado, a pro se petitioner, who is a restaurant cook, sued
because his work ended due to Governor Polis’s coronavirus
pandemic shutdown, and his free exercise of religion has been
impaired because gatherings of more than ten people were
prohibited.19 The petitioner also alleged there is no valid coronavirus
“[c]lose to 3 million employees in the restaurant sector remain out of work”); Josh Mitchell, State
Shutdowns Have Taken at Least a Quarter of U.S. Economy Offline, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 5,
2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/state-coronavirus-shutdowns-have-taken-29-of-u-seconomy-offline-11586079001 (“At least one-quarter of the U.S. economy has suddenly gone idle
amid the coronavirus pandemic, an analysis conducted for The Wall Street Journal shows, an
unprecedented shutdown of commerce that economists say has never occurred on such a wide
scale.”); Bethany Jean Clement, James Beard Survey Suggests 4 out of 5 Restaurants May Not
Survive a Prolonged Coronavirus Shutdown—Our Critic on What We Stand to Lose, SEATTLE
TIMES (May 1, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.seattletimes.com/life/food-drink/4-out-of-5restaurants-may-not-reopen-our-restaurant-critic-on-what-we-stand-to-lose/ (“[Restaurant]
[o]wners report having laid off 91% of hourly workers and nearly 70% of salaried ones.”).
15. See, e.g., Chris Woodyard, ‘Makes No Sense’: California Faces Backlash Over Its New
Tiered System for Reopening Businesses Amid COVID-19, USA TODAY (Sept. 1, 2020, 10:29 AM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2020/09/01/coronavirus-california-faces-backlashover-new-tiered-reopening-plan/3449500001/.
16. Paul Bass, Suit Seeks to Quash Emergency Orders, NEW HAVEN INDEP. (Apr. 7, 2020,
4:08 PM), https://www.newhavenindependent.org/index.php/archives/entry/
covid_lawsuit/.
17. See Complaint at 12, Dodero v. Walton Cnty., No. 3:20-cv-05358-RV-HTC, 2020 WL
1868995 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 6, 2020) [hereinafter Dodero Complaint] (“The County and Sheriff’s
physical appropriation of Plaintiffs’ beachfront properties violates the Plaintiffs’ rights under the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”); see also
Dodero v. Walton Cnty., No. 3:20cv5358-RV/HTC, 2020 WL 5879130, at *1 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 17,
2020).
18. Dodero Complaint, supra note 17, at 15.
19. Lawrence v. Colorado, 455 F. Supp. 3d 1063, 1065–69 (D. Colo. 2020); see also Calvary
Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, 140 S. Ct. 2603, 2604–05 (2020) (denying injunctive relief to a
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emergency and sought an injunction to end the state’s shutdown
order.20 A federal judge denied the injunctive request due to, inter alia,
the emergency nature of the orders.21
In California, attorney Mark Geragos22 sued Governor Gavin
Newsom for a Fifth Amendment taking, representing, inter alia, a
Mexican restaurant, a special effects lighting company, a pet groomer,
and a gondola service.23 Mark Geragos alleged that Governor
Newsom’s Shelter-in-Place Order violated the constitutionally
protected rights to travel, due process, and equal protection as well as
Fifth Amendment takings.24
In Maryland, housing providers sought an injunction against laws
that prevented landlords from increasing rents during the pandemic.25
The petitioners alleged that these laws constituted a regulatory taking
under both the Federal and Maryland Constitutions.26 The federal
court denied the request for an injunction because “the appropriate
remedy for these claims is not equitable in nature.”27 Because money
damages were adequate, an injunction was inappropriate.28
In Tennessee, the owners of several restaurants filed for a
temporary restraining order to prevent Shelby County from enforcing
a COVID-19 closure order, which required the closure of the
plaintiffs’ establishments.29 The court denied the motion for injunctive
church that argued it was entitled to meet under the Free Exercise Clause, despite the governor of
Nevada’s order to the contrary). But see Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct.
63 (2020) (granting injunctive relief to religious entities against Governor Cuomo’s capacity limits
on in-person services).
20. Lawrence, 455 F. Supp. 3d at 1066, 1073.
21. Id. at 1067.
22. Geragos is a celebrity attorney who has represented Michael Jackson, Michael Avenatti,
Susan McDougal, and several other famous and controversial figures. Richard Winton & James
Quealley, Caught Up in Avenatti Scandal, Mark Geragos Finds Himself on the Other Side of the
Law, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2019, 9:20 AM), https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-markgeragos-profile-20190327-story.html.
23. Complaint at 6–8, 19, Gondola Adventures, Inc. v. Newsom, No. 2:20-cv-03789 (C.D.
Cal. Apr. 24, 2020).
24. Id. at 6, 19, 21, 22.
25. Willowbrook Apt. Assocs., v. Baltimore, No. SAG-20-1818, 2020 WL 3639991, at *1 (D.
Md. July 6, 2020).
26. Id. at *3.
27. Id. at *4; see also Xponential Fitness v. Arizona, No. CV-20-01310-PHX-DJH, 2020 WL
3971908, at *9 (D. Ariz. July 14, 2020) (“[E]ven if the [Governor’s Executive Order] did violate
Plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment rights, Plaintiffs would not be entitled to injunctive relief because
damages are the proper remedy for a taking.” (citing Bridge Aina Le’a, LLC v. Hawaii Land Use
Comm’n, 125 F. Supp. 3d 1051, 1066 (D. Haw. 2015))).
28. Willowbrook, 2020 WL 3639991, at *4.
29. TJM 64, Inc. v. Harris, 475 F. Supp. 3d 828, 832 (W.D. Tenn. 2020).
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relief because “Plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on the merits of their
constitutional claims and given the potential public health
consequences of allowing Plaintiffs to continue to operate their
businesses.”30
In Massachusetts (and several other states), local authorities
enacted moratoria on evictions.31 Landlords sued seeking to enjoin the
moratorium but were ultimately unsuccessful.32 In Massachusetts, the
superior court first rejected the argument that the prohibition on
ejecting tenants constituted a “physical invasion” by the
government.33 The court also found that the moratorium did not
interfere with the plaintiffs’ reasonable investment-backed
expectations34 and did not, therefore, constitute a taking.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court—in the first published
appellate case to consider the issue—denied the claims of a
congressional candidate, a real estate agent, a golf course, and a
restaurant.35 The parties’ constitutional challenges included a taking
without compensation under the Fifth Amendment.36 According to the
court, “the payment of just compensation is not required where the
regulation of property involves the exercise of the Commonwealth’s
police power.”37 The outcome was no surprise.
Under the current state of takings law, arguments in favor of a
Fifth Amendment Taking by such plaintiffs are unlikely to be
successful.38 The state-mandated closures are temporary, and were put
in place to promote the health, safety, and welfare of society, a core
police power39 and an established background principle of property

30. Id. at 841.
31. Memorandum of Decision and Order on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction at
3–5, Matorin v. Massachusetts, No. 2084CV01334 (Aug. 26, 2020).
32. Id. at 34.
33. Id. at 20.
34. Id. at 26.
35. Friends of Danny DeVito v. Wolf, 227 A.3d 872, 876–77 (Pa. 2020).
36. Id. at 893.
37. Id.
38. See Bernadette Meyler, Shelter-in-Place Orders Are Perfectly Legal, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 29, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/29/opinion/shelter-in-place-constitution.html.
39. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 203 (1824) (stating that police power is “that immense
mass of legislation, which embraces every thing within the territory of a State, not surrendered to
the general government”).
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law. Those regulations also likely kept the early 2020 coronavirus
pandemic from becoming worse.40
These health and safety exceptions to otherwise colorable takings
claims are arguably at odds with the plain language of the Fifth
Amendment itself and the Supreme Court’s oft-cited admonition that
the impetus for the Takings Clause is to protect individuals from
shouldering the burdens that society should bear.41 Unfortunately, the
coronavirus pandemic shutdown illustrates the inadequacy of takings
law in distributing burdens among individuals particularly impacted
by sweeping government shutdowns.
III. FIFTH AMENDMENT TAKINGS LAW
The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides in part:
“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.”42 Each clause in this sentence has been heavily
litigated. The focus of this Article is whether private property has been
“taken” such that just compensation is due under the Fifth
Amendment.43 “The general rule at least is that while property may be
regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking.”44 This is a maddeningly vague standard for
litigants.
Many property and business owners allege that social distancing
restrictions and the concomitant shutdowns imposed by the
coronavirus pandemic resulted in their property being “taken” by the
government such that just compensation is due.45 The bar, however, is

40. See, e.g., Joel Achenbach, As Social Distancing Shows Signs of Working, What’s Next?
Crush the Curve, Experts Say, WASH. POST (Apr. 8, 2020, 2:11 PM), https://www.washingtonpos
t.com/national/health-science/as-social-distancing-shows-signs-of-working-whats-next-crush-thecurve-experts-say/2020/04/08/3c720e06-7923-11ea-b6ff-597f170df8f8_story.html.
41. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
42. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment applies to the states under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226,
239 (1897).
43. This Article involves government imposing restrictions (shutdown order) on the
operations of private entities to restrict gatherings and close personal contact that may further the
spread of the coronavirus. The property is therefore “private” and the purpose (restricting the spread
of the disease) is “public.” The amount of “just compensation” is discussed in footnote 45. The
question addressed by this Article, is whether there is a regulatory “taking” at all.
44. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
45. Just compensation is “fair market value.” United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374
(1943); see also Backus v. Fort St. Union Depot Co., 169 U.S. 557, 573, 575 (1898) (“[W]hen [the]
power [of eminent domain] is exercised it can only be done by giving the party whose property is
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necessarily high for a property owner to prove that “just
compensation” is due when a regulation restricts use, particularly
when the justification for the restriction is a public health and safety
concern. Unfortunately, the test for determining whether a taking has
occurred is a “muddle,”46 and pandemic-related regulations are likely
to further the confusion.
A. Penn Central’s Ad Hoc Three-Part Balancing Test
The Fifth Amendment takings analysis begins with the seminal
taking case, Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York.47 In Penn
Central, the owners of Grand Central Station (“Station”) in New York
City sought to partner with UGP Properties (“UGP”) to build a multistory office building in the airspace above the Station.48 The proposed
project complied with all zoning and building requirements,49 but
because the station had been designated as a landmark under the City’s
Landmark Preservation Law, UGP and Penn Central were required to
apply to New York’s Landmark Preservation Committee
(“Committee”) for the requisite “certificate of ‘appropriateness.’”50
The Committee denied permission of the plan to cantilever a fifty-fivestory office building over the Station.51
Penn Central and UGP challenged the Committee’s decision by
bringing a Fifth Amendment takings claim.52 The U.S. Supreme Court
taken or whose use and enjoyment of such property is interfered with, full and adequate
compensation, not excessive or exorbitant, but just compensation.”).
46. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, The Police Power Revisited: Phantom Incorporation and the
Roots of the Takings “Muddle”, 90 MINN. L. REV. 826, 827 (2006) (“Despite a series of highprofile decisions over the last three decades, the Supreme Court has failed to solve the riddle it
posed for itself in the seminal case of the modern regulatory takings era, Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. City of New York: When does a regulation burdening property rise to the
level of a compensable ‘taking’?”).
47. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
48. Id. at 116.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 115–17. A certificate of appropriateness will be granted “if the Commission
concludes—focusing upon aesthetic, historical, and architectural values—that the proposed
construction won the landmark site would not unduly hinder the protection, enhancement,
perpetuation, and use of the landmark.” Id. at 112.
51. Id. at 116–17. The Commission also rejected a fifty-three-story proposal that involved
removal of a portion of the Station’s façade. The Commission stated: “To protect a Landmark, one
does not tear it down. To perpetuate its architectural features, one does not strip them off.” Id. at
117.
52. Id. at 122 (“[T]he issues presented . . . are (1) whether the restrictions imposed by New
York City’s law upon appellants’ exploitation of the Terminal site effect a ‘taking’ of appellants’
property for a public use within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment . . . . ”).
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denied the claim, and in doing so articulated a three-part test to
determine whether a taking has occurred. Accordingly:
when a regulation impedes the use of property without
depriving the owner of all economically beneficial use, a
taking still may be found based on a “complex of factors,”
including: (1) the economic impact on the regulation on the
claimant; (2) the extent to which the regulation has interfered
with distinct53 investment-backed expectations; and (3) the
character of the governmental action54
(the “Penn Central Test”). The Penn Central Test is an “ad hoc
factual inquir[y], designed to allow careful examination and
weighing of all the relevant circumstances.”55
In formulating the Penn Central Test, the Court was guided by
the principle set forth in Armstrong v. United States56: the “Fifth
Amendment guarantee . . . [is] designed to bar Government from
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness
and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole”57 (the
“Armstrong Principle”). The Penn Central Court acknowledged there
has been considerable difficulty in identifying a taking under the Fifth
Amendment, and articulated the Penn Central Test to set a formula for
situations where “‘justice and fairness’ require that economic injuries
caused by public action be compensated by the government, rather
than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons.”58
The Court rejected Penn Central and UGP’s argument that they
were solely burdened and unbenefited by New York’s Landmark
Preservation Law.59 According to the Court, this argument “overlooks

53. The Supreme Court later changed the word “distinct” to “reasonable” investment backed
expectations. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979).
54. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1943 (2017); see Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. at
124; see also Steven J. Eagle, The Four-Factor Penn Central Regulatory Takings Test, 118 PENN
ST. L. REV. 601, 601 (2014) (arguing that there is a fourth factor—related to the “relevant parcel”—
in the Penn Central Test); Gary Lawson, et. al., “Oh Lord, Please Don’t Let Me Be
Misunderstood!”: Rediscovering the Matthews v. Eldridge and Penn Central Frameworks, 81
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 32 (2005) (arguing there are two factors rather than three).
55. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1942 (quoting Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning
Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 322 (2002)).
56. 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
57. Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. at 123–24 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S.
40, 49 (1960)); see also Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1943 (quoting Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606,
617–18 (2001)).
58. Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. at 124 (emphasis added).
59. Id. at 134–36.
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the fact that the New York City law applies to vast numbers of
structures in the City in addition to the Terminal.”60 The fact that a
particular property owner may be more burdened than benefited in a
particular case does not rise to the level of a taking.61 “[I]n instances
in which a state tribunal reasonably concluded that ‘the health, safety,
morals, or general welfare’ would be promoted by prohibiting
particular contemplated uses of land, this Court has upheld land-use
regulations that destroyed or adversely affected recognized real
property interests.”62
Under Penn Central, the three-part ad hoc balancing test is a
means to determine whether justice and fairness dictate that a taking
has occurred, in harmony with the Armstrong Principle. Absent one of
the exceptions below, a court will apply the Penn Central Test in all
Fifth Amendment takings cases. Most pandemic shutdown litigants
will have to show their situation meets the Penn Central Test, which
is already notoriously difficult.63
B. Lucas’s Total Deprivation Test
The Penn Central Test specifically applies to situations in which
a regulation did not deprive the property owner of all economically
viable use of the property.64 That situation was later addressed in
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.65
In Lucas, a property owner purchased two waterfront lots in 1986
for $975,000.66 The two lots were surrounded by single-family homes,
and Lucas’s were the last two vacant lots on the Isle of Palms, in
Charleston County, South Carolina.67 Two years after Lucas
60. Id. at 134.
61. Id. at 133–35; see, e.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (the property owner
was more burdened than benefited by the applicable regulation without the court finding a Fifth
Amendment taking); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (same); Vill. of Euclid
v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (same); cf. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413
(1922) (“Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be
diminished without paying for every such change in the general law.”).
62. Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. at 125.
63. A recent study found that less than 10 percent of takings cases are successful under a Penn
Central analysis. James E. Krier & Stewart E. Sterk, An Empirical Study of Implicit Takings, 58
WM. & MARY L. REV. 35, 59–60 (2016).
64. Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. at 138 n.36 (“The city conceded at oral argument that if
appellants can demonstrate at some point in the future that circumstances have so changed that the
Terminal ceases to be ‘economically viable,’ appellants may obtain relief.”).
65. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
66. Id. at 1006.
67. Id. at 1009, 1038.
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purchased the parcels, the state of South Carolina passed the
Beachfront Management Act that effectively prohibited Lucas from
building on either of his lots.68 Lucas sued, alleging a taking of his
property under the Fifth Amendment.69 The Court found a taking and
articulated a new test, which constituted a per se exception to the threepart Penn Central Test.70
Under Lucas, a regulation that “denies all economically beneficial
or productive use of land” will require compensation under the
Takings Clause—unless the regulation is consistent with “background
principles of nuisance and property law.”71 In other words, if a
regulation eliminates a property’s economic viability, it will
automatically constitute a taking, unless that regulation is consistent
with “background principles” of property law.72 This is the first per se
exception to the three-part Penn Central Test.73
In Lucas, the U.S. Supreme Court overturned the South Carolina
Supreme Court, which “ruled that when a regulation respecting the use
of property is designed ‘to prevent serious public harm,’ no
compensation is owing under the Takings Clause regardless of the
regulation’s effect on the property’s value,”74 citing to Mugler v.
Kansas. 75 In fact, Lucas did not challenge the assertion that the
beachfront management act protected a valuable resource or that new
construction contributed to the erosion of this public resource.76
According to the Lucas court, however, the Beachfront Management
Act denied a previously permissible productive use, and did not
therefore constitute a background principle of property or nuisance
law that would have exempted the state from providing just
compensation.77
Since Lucas, however, courts have been progressively reluctant
to find a total deprivation of economically viable use. For example, in
68. Id. at 1007.
69. Id. at 1009.
70. Id. at 1016.
71. Id. at 1016, 1031; see also Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 576 U.S. 350, 361–62 (2015)
(extending the Lucas “total deprivation” test to a government appropriation of physical property
such as raisins).
72. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031.
73. Id at 1031–32.
74. Id. at 1010.
75. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
76. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1020.
77. Id. at 1031.
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Leone v. County of Maui,78 the Hawaii Supreme Court held that
regulations that leave land in its natural state do not always constitute
a taking,79 clarifying that the Lucas rule is not absolute—and the scope
of “background principles” is expanding.80
Many litigants affected by the coronavirus government
shutdowns may allege that their property (or business) has suffered a
Lucas-style total deprivation of all economically viable use, but: (1)
the pandemic government shutdowns are temporary (unlike Lucas)
and (2) the public health impetus for the pandemic regulations is likely
more compelling than even the Beachfront Management Act in
Lucas—as a background principle of property law. Such claims are
therefore unlikely to be successful under Lucas.
Mr. Lucas also has a stronger “fairness and justice” argument than
do the coronavirus litigants. Lucas had two empty lots in a large
neighborhood of single-family homes and was singled out to bear the
burden of the Beachfront Management Act, while the coronavirus
litigants represent wide sectors of business interests.81 Similarly, the
petitioners in Armstrong itself were a group of government contractors
whose mechanic’s liens were invalidated by the federal government
when a shipbuilder went bankrupt.82 Upon the shipbuilder’s
bankruptcy, title to the ship went to the government under the
applicable contract, and since liens are prohibited for public work, the
government had “inchoate title” to the ships.83 The Supreme Court
held that the liens constituted a property interest that was unlawfully
“taken” under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause.84
C. Loretto’s Physical Invasion Test
Another per se exception to the Penn Central Test is when the
government physically occupies property. In Loretto v. Teleprompter
78. 404 P.3d 1257 (Haw. 2017).
79. Id. at 1274.
80. See Krier & Sterk, supra note 63, at 59–60 tbls. 2–3 (showing a 25.8 percent success rate
for “total wipeout” cases under Lucas); see also Michael C. Blumm & Lucus Ritchie, Lucas’s
Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of Background Principles as Categorical Takings Defenses, 29 HARV.
ENV’T L. REV. 321, 368 (2005) (“[J]udicial use of background principles seem likely to expand, as
government defendants continue to present various categories of Lucas defenses to state and federal
courts.”).
81. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1006–07.
82. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 41–42 (1960).
83. Id. at 42.
84. Id. at 43–44.
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Manhattan CATV Corp.,85 a property owner sued over a city
regulation that allowed cable companies to install cable equipment on
buildings.86
Although the offending cable boxes were only two by four inches,
along with half-inch wide connecting cable, the Court found that a
permanent physical invasion authorized by government regulation is
always a taking. The Court considered a physical invasion of property
to be a restriction of “an unusually serious character” because it
“effectively destroys” the right to possess, use, and dispose of the
property.87 When there is a permanent physical occupation of real
property, “there is a taking to the extent of the occupation, without
regard to whether the action achieves an important public benefit or
has only minimal economic impact on the owner.”88
After Loretto, many litigants tried to shoehorn their takings
claims into physical invasions. For instance, in Yee v. City of
Escondido,89 a mobile home park owner unsuccessfully claimed that
a rent control ordinance effected a physical taking.90 More recently, in
Cedar Point Nursery v. Shiroma,91 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
failed to find a valid taking claim under a Loretto physical invasion
theory for a regulation that required business owners to open up their
land to union organizers.92
Although a coronavirus litigant is unlikely to be able to show a
true physical invasion, if they could, they would probably have a
successful takings claim because physical invasions are of an
“unusually serious character,” and even temporary physical invasions
are actionable.93

85. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
86. Id. at 421–22.
87. Id. at 426, 435.
88. Id. at 434–35 (emphasis added).
89. 503 U.S. 519 (1992).
90. Id. at 539.
91. 923 F.3d 524 (9th Cir. 2019).
92. Id. at 532–33 (citing PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980)) (finding
that requiring a shopping center to be a public forum for speech did not constitute a Fifth
Amendment taking). On November 13, 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in Cedar
Point. See Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, No. 20-107, 2020 WL 6686019 (2020) (mem.).
93. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426, 427, 435 fn.12 (“When faced with a constitutional challenge to
a permanent physical occupation of real property, this Court has invariably found a taking.”). At
least one coronavirus shutdown petitioner has alleged a physical taking—due to beach patrols that
cut off access to private property. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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D. Temporary Takings
A regulation need not be permanent to constitute a taking, which
is critical to the analysis of whether coronavirus related government
shutdown restrictions constitute either a regulatory or physical taking
under the Fifth Amendment.
In First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v.
County of Los Angeles,94 a retreat and recreational center for
handicapped children in Mill Canyon was destroyed after a fire, and
subsequent flooding swept the property.95 In response to the flooding
in the canyon, the County of Los Angeles adopted an ordinance which
prohibited construction in the interim flood protection area in Mill
Canyon.96 The church alleged a temporary taking, and the Supreme
Court stated that “‘temporary’ takings which, as here, deny a
landowner all use of his property, are not different from permanent
takings, for which the Constitution clearly requires compensation.”97
The Court remanded for further proceedings to determine if a taking
had occurred.98
On remand, the California court found that there was no Fifth
Amendment taking and therefore the church was not entitled to
compensation.99 The court—relying on Mugler—first said that the
ordinance was justified by health and safety concerns; and second, that
the church was allowed to use any buildings that were not destroyed
by flood and it could use the property for any purpose other than
reconstructing demolished buildings or erecting new ones.100 There
was therefore no temporary taking for the church under either Lucas
or Penn Central.101
The temporary takings analysis, however, should also be
analyzed in light of Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe
Regional Planning Agency,102 which considered whether a thirty-twomonth moratorium on development constituted a Fifth Amendment

94. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
95. Id. at 307.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 318.
98. Id. at 322.
99. First Eng. Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 258 Cal.
Rptr. 893, 905–06 (Ct. App. 1989).
100. Id. at 899.
101. Id. at 906.
102. 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
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taking.103 The plaintiffs in Tahoe-Sierra alleged a Lucas-style per se
taking due to a prohibition on all development in the lake Tahoe region
that was subject to the Planning Agency’s jurisdiction.104 The Court
held that there was no per se taking based on the denominator or
“parcel as a whole” concept.105 According to the Court, the ability to
develop a parcel for thirty-two months was only part of a landowner’s
rights because:
Both dimensions must be considered if the interest is to be
viewed in its entirety. Hence, a permanent deprivation of the
owner’s use of the entire area is a taking of “the parcel as a
whole,” whereas a temporary restriction that merely causes a
diminution in value is not. Logically, a fee simple estate
cannot be rendered valueless by a temporary prohibition on
economic use, because the property will recover value as
soon as the prohibition is lifted.106
Therefore, under Tahoe-Sierra, a temporary taking can never be
tantamount to a “total deprivation” under Lucas. However, the Court
left open the possibility of a temporary taking under Penn Central’s
three-part test107—although meeting that test will be nearly
impossible.108
Lower courts have attempted to reconcile Tahoe-Sierra and First
English by identifying the parameters of myriad temporary takings.
According to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, in Seiber v. United States109:
Supreme Court cases, as well as decisions from our own
court, recognize that a temporary taking may arise in one of
two ways. First, “a temporary taking occurs when what
would otherwise be a permanent taking is temporally cut
short.” Temporary takings of this category may result when
103. Id. at 306.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 331 (“To sever a 32-month segment from the remainder of each fee simple estate
and then ask whether that segment has been taken in its entirety would ignore Penn Central’s
admonition to focus on ‘the parcel as a whole.’” (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New
York, 438 U.S. 104, 130–31 (1978))).
106. Id. at 332.
107. Id. at 334 (“[T]he ultimate constitutional question is whether the concepts of ‘fairness and
justice’ that underlie the Takings Clause will be better served by one of these categorical rules or
by a Penn Central inquiry into all of the relevant circumstances in particular cases.”).
108. Id.
109. 364 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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“a court invalidates a regulation” that had previously effected
a taking, “when the government elects to discontinue
regulations after a taking has occurred,” or when “the
government denies a permit . . . [and] at some [later] point
reconsiders the earlier denial and grants a permit (or revokes
the permitting requirement).” The “essential element” of this
type of temporary taking “is a finite start and end to the
taking,” In the case of a rescinded permit denial, therefore,
“the initial denial of a permit is still a necessary trigger” for
the temporary taking.
Alternatively, a temporary “taking may occur by reason of
extraordinary delay in [the] governmental decision making”
process. In such a case, a property owner may be entitled to
compensation for property loss incurred while the
government was in the process of deciding whether to allow
the contested activity. This type of temporary takings claim
may be asserted “notwithstanding the failure [of the
government] to deny a permit” or affirmatively prohibit a
certain use of the property. Nonetheless, “mere fluctuations
in value during the process of governmental decision
making, absent extraordinary delay” do not give rise to a
compensable temporary taking under this second category
because such losses are considered “incidents of
ownership.”110
In other words, to constitute a temporary taking in the coronavirus
regulation context, the enactment of a “stay in place” regulation may
constitute a “triggering event,” and if the stay in place regulation were
stricken down (for example) because it was arbitrary and capricious
and a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause,
or the Equal Protection Clause, there may be a valid takings claim for
the period that the invalid “stay in place” regulation was in effect—if
the landowner was able to prove a taking under Penn Central’s threepart test.111 There may also be a valid temporary takings claim if there

110. Id. at 1364–65 (alterations in original) (first quoting Wyatt v. United States, 271 F.3d 1090,
1097 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 2001); then Boise Cascade Corp. v. United States, 296 F.3d 1339, 1347 (Fed.
Cir. 2002) (analyzing a Fifth Amendment takings claim over the denial of a permit to harvest timber
due to the listing of the Spotted Owl under the Endangered Species Act); and then citing Cooley v.
United States, 324 F.3d 1297, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
111. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 330.
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is an unreasonable delay or when a government elects to discontinue
a regulation after a taking has occurred.112 A Lucas-style “total
deprivation” claim for a temporary taking in the coronavirus
government shutdown context is precluded by Tahoe Sierra.
It is also possible to have a temporary taking in the case of a
Loretto physical invasion of property. In Arkansas Game and Fish
Commission v. United States,113 the U.S. Supreme Court held that a
temporary taking was possible for government-induced seasonal
flooding over the commission’s property.114 The only issue before the
Court was whether such a claim (a temporary physical invasion) was
categorically exempt from a Fifth Amendment taking claim, and the
Court held that it was not.115 However, any such claim would still have
to meet the three-part Penn Central Test.116
E. The Public Health and Safety Exception to Takings Claims
Both Penn Central and Lucas contemplate some sort of exception
to the takings analysis for regulations that concern the general health,
safety and welfare;117 particularly when such concerns produce a
widespread public benefit and are applicable to “all similarly situated
112. Seiber, 364 F.3d at 1364.
113. 568 U.S. 23 (2012).
114. Id. at 27 (arguing there was a permanent taking due to the destruction of trees on the
flooded property); see Brian T. Hodges, Will Arkansas Game & Fish Commission v. United States
Provide a Permanent Fix for Temporary Takings?, 41 B.C. ENV’T AFFS. L. REV. 365, 365 (2014)
(stating that there are no categorical exemptions to liability for government actions that are
temporary in nature).
115. Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 568 U.S. at 38 (“We rule today, simply and only, that
government-induced flooding temporary in duration gains no automatic exemption from Takings
Clause inspection.”).
116. Id. at 39 (noting that under Arkansas Game and Fish, the owner’s reasonable investmentbacked expectations are part of the analysis in determining whether a temporary physical taking is
compensable). For another viewpoint, see Hodges, supra note 114, at 388–92 (arguing that the test
is the same for both temporary and permanent physical takings). See Bridge Aina Le’a, LLC v.
Land Use Comm’n, 950 F.3d 610, 631–33 (9th Cir. 2020) (applying the valuation prong of the
Penn Central Test to a temporary taking and concluding that the valuation evidence weighs strongly
against a taking).
117. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 125 (1978) (“More
importantly for the present case, in instances in which a state tribunal reasonably concluded that
‘the health, safety, morals, or general welfare’ would be promoted by prohibiting particular
contemplated uses of land, this Court has upheld land-use regulations that destroyed or adversely
affected recognized real property interests.”); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1023
(1992) (finding that Hadacheck, Miller, and Goldblatt “are better understood as resting not on any
supposed ‘noxious’ quality of the prohibited uses but rather on the ground that the restrictions were
reasonably related to the implementation of a policy—not unlike historic preservation—expected
to produce a widespread public benefit and applicable to all similarly situated property” (quoting
Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. at 133–34 n.30)).
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property [owners].”118 Courts have traditionally been deferential
toward local jurisdictions’ authority to regulate for health and safety
under the applicable police power.119 Therefore, if the government has
enacted a valid regulation for the protection of safety, health, and
welfare, courts will not find a Fifth Amendment taking.
An analysis of the extent of a state’s authority to regulate health
and safety without compensation begins with Mugler v. Kansas,120
cited by both Penn Central121 and Lucas.122 Mugler involved a
challenge to a Kansas constitutional amendment that prohibited the
sale and manufacture of liquor.123 When the Kansas constitutional
amendment passed, all liquor sales and manufacturing were declared
a common nuisance.124 After Mugler’s brewery was declared a
nuisance, he claimed “most earnestly and confidently, that his right to
operate his brewery as vested in him by the laws of Kansas, cannot be
taken away by the State without just compensation.”125 According to
the Mugler Court:
[T]he present case must be governed by principles that do not
involve the power of eminent domain, in the exercise of
which property may not be taken for public use without
118. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1023 (1992) (quoting Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. at 133–34 n.30).
119. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887) (stating that the police powers of a state
“determine, primarily, what measures are appropriate or needful for the protection of the public
morals, the public health, or the public safety,” subject to constitutional limits); Cal. Reduction Co.
v. Sanitary Reduction Works, 199 U.S. 306, 306 (1905) (holding that an ordinance limiting garbage
burning to certain areas was not a compensable taking under the city’s authority to regulate public
health); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 592 (1962) (“If this ordinance is otherwise
a valid exercise of the town’s police powers, the fact that it deprives the property of its most
beneficial use does not render it unconstitutional.”); see also id. at 596 (“Our past cases leave no
doubt that [challengers to police power] had the burden on ‘reasonableness.’” (citing Bibb v.
Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520, 529 (1959) (arguing that the exercise of police power is
presumed to be constitutionally valid))); Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545, 553 (1954) (“The
presumption of reasonableness is with the State.”); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S.
144, 154 (1938) (stating that the exercise of police power will be upheld if “any state of facts either
known or which could reasonably be assumed affords support for it”).
120. Mugler, 123 U.S. at 623.
121. Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. at 126 (citing Mugler, 123 U.S. at 623) (upholding law that
prohibited liquor business).
122. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1010, 1022–23, 1033 (Kennedy, J., concurring). The South Carolina
Supreme Court had rejected Lucas’s takings claim based on a Mugler analysis. See id. at 1010
(“[The South Carolina Supreme Court] ruled that when a regulation respecting the use of property
is designed to ‘prevent serious public harm,’ . . . no compensation is owing under the Takings
Clause regardless of the regulation’s effect on the property’s value.”).
123. Mugler, 123 U.S. at 624.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 637.
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compensation. A prohibition simply upon the use of property
for purposes that are declared, by valid legislation, to be
injurious to the health, morals, or safety of the community,
cannot, in any just sense, be deemed a taking or an
appropriation of property for the public benefit. Such
legislation does not disturb the owner in the control or use of
his property for lawful purposes, nor restrict his right to
dispose of it, but is only a declaration by the State that its use
by any one, for certain forbidden purposes, is prejudicial to
the public interests. . . . The power which the States have of
prohibiting such use by individuals of their property, as will
be prejudicial to the health, the morals, or the safety of the
public, is not—and, consistently with the existence and
safety of organized society, cannot be—burdened with the
condition that the State must compensate such individual
owners for pecuniary losses they may sustain, by reason of
their not being permitted, by a noxious use of their property,
to inflict injury upon the community.126
The U.S. Supreme Court therefore rejected Mugler’s argument. In
doing so, the Court extended tremendous deference to legislative
authorities in the supervision of public health.127
Following Mugler, in Miller v. Schoene,128 the U.S. Supreme
Court denied compensation for a property owner who was forced to
cut down ornamental red cedar trees by the state entomologist because
there was a danger of spreading plant disease to a nearby orchard.129
Miller challenged the state’s decision under a Fourteenth Amendment
substantive due process theory.130 According to the Court, “the state
does not exceed its constitutional powers by deciding upon the
destruction of one class of property in order to save another which, in
the judgment of the legislature, is of greater value to the public.”131
This determination is at the core of every exercise of police power that
affects real property.132
126. Id. at 668–69 (emphasis added).
127. Id. at 669 (citing Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814 (1879)).
128. 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
129. Id. at 277.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 279.
132. Id. at 279–80; see also Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 414 (1915) (“We must
accord good faith to the city in the absence of a clear showing to the contrary and an honest exercise
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In Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead,133 the U.S. Supreme Court—
also following Mugler—denied compensation for a property owner in
Hempstead, New York, who operated a gravel mine within the town’s
limits.134 The town had enacted a new ordinance regulating dredging
and excavating and subsequently sued a mine owner for failing to
comply with the new law.135 The mine owners alleged the new law
prevented them from operating their decades-old business and was an
unlawful exercise of police power.136 The ordinance prohibited a
beneficial use to which the property had been put and was arguably
not even a nuisance.137 The Goldblatt Court upheld the ordinance
because the interest of the public required it, and the means necessary
to accomplish the purpose were not unduly burdensome.138
Regulations enacted by states—mostly by governors139—in
response to the coronavirus pandemic concern widespread public
health matters and were largely applicable to all similarly situated land
(or business) owners. The health, safety, and welfare cases show
courts will generally defer to legislative and executive authorities in
their supervision of public health.140 Those determinations, in turn, are
a valid defense to most Fifth Amendment takings cases.
In Luke’s Catering Service, LLC v. Cuomo,141 the Federal District
Court of the Western District of New York stated:
When faced with a society-threatening epidemic, state
officials are empowered to implement emergency protective
measures that infringe federal constitutional rights. They
of judgment upon the circumstances which induced its action.”). Hadacheck involved a challenge
to the city’s ordinance preventing the manufacture of bricks or operation of a brickyard. Hadacheck
alleged the ordinance took his property without compensation, it did not create a public offense and
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court rejected his argument,
deferring to the legislature’s exercise of its police power. Id. at 413.
133. 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
134. Id. at 591.
135. Id. at 592.
136. Id. at 590–91.
137. Id. at 592.
138. Id. at 594–95 (citing Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894)).
139. In Washington state, for example, a governor may enact emergency health and safety
regulations for thirty days. Any extension must be approved by the state legislature. WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 43.06.220(4) (LexisNexis 2020).
140. See, e.g., S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613, 1613–14 (2020)
(Roberts, C.J., concurring) (stating that when state officials “undertake[] to act in areas fraught with
medical and scientific uncertainties,” their latitude “must be especially broad”; and “where those
broad limits are not exceeded, they should not be subject to second-guessing by an ‘unelected . . .
judiciary’”).
141. No. 20-CV-1086S, 2020 WL 5425008, at *1 (W.D. N.Y. Sept. 10, 2020).
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may generally do so at their sole discretion and for so long
as is necessary. And as long as the emergency measures bear
some real or substantial relation to the threatening epidemic
and are not unquestionably a plain invasion of rights, the
efficacy and wisdom of those measures are not subject to
judicial second-guessing.142
The Luke’s Catering court denied plaintiffs’ request for an
injunction under inter alia Fifth Amendment takings and equal
protection grounds because the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate
“beyond all question, a plain, palpable invasion of rights.”143
IV. DUE PROCESS/EQUAL PROTECTION
Opponents to many governor-initiated lockdowns claimed that
the actions were “arbitrary” and “capricious.”144 These are buzz words
for a potential Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim,
which may be applied to executive and legislative abuses of power.145
Generally, to prove a claim under most coronavirus pandemic
regulation objections, a claimant would have to show that the
regulation is not rationally related to a legitimate government

142. Id. at *1.
143. Id. at *6.
144. See, e.g., TJM 64, Inc. v. Harris, 475 F. Supp. 3d 828, 833 (W.D. Tenn. 2020) (“Plaintiffs’
substantive due process challenge alleges that the COVID-19 Closure Order is ‘capricious,
irrational, arbitrary and abusive conduct . . . .’”); see also COVID Thursday Update: Petition Urges
Governor to Lift State of Emergency Order, Outbreak Identified in Concord, CONCORD MONITO
R (Apr. 16, 2020, 12:59 PM), https://www.concordmonitor.com/COVID-updates-Thursday-rallyto-reopen-New-Hampshire-33919268 (petition urged Governor Sununu to rescind declaration of
emergency because “[w]e believe the emergency orders issued by Gov. Sununu are arbitrary and
unbalanced, particularly in determining ‘essential’ and ‘non essential’ organizations and allowing
people to assemble in the supermarket but not in their place of work or community, which are
equally susceptible to transmission of the virus”); Molly Beck & Madeline Heim, GOP Leaders
Seeking to Overturn Tony Evers’ Coronavirus Orders Aren’t Saying What Alternatives They Want,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Apr. 23, 2020, 2:29 PM), https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/politic
s/2020/04/23/wisconsin-gop-silent-what-new-coronavirus-rules-should-republican-tony-eversgov-democrat-covid-19/3003763001/ (legislators calling for a Department of Health Service Plan
that is not “arbitrary and capricious”).
145. See generally Rosalie Berger Levinson, Reining in Abuses of Executive Power Through
Substantive Due Process, 60 FLA. L. REV. 519, 519 (2008) (“[I]t is well established that the Due
Process Clause includes a substantive component that ‘bars certain arbitrary wrongful government
actions “regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.”’”).
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objective.146 One way to do this is to show the government action is
arbitrary and capricious.147
A substantive due process claim is separate and distinct from the
takings claim procedures outlined above.148 However, a coronavirus
pandemic shelter-in-place order that reaches the notoriously difficult
arbitrary and capricious threshold may, in turn, be a basis for a
temporary taking for the time that the regulation was in effect. In other
words, if an emergency order was shown to have no rational relation
to a legitimate government objective (by showing the regulation is
arbitrary and capricious), the property or business owner may be able
to obtain damages for the time that the regulation was in effect and the
time the regulation was struck down.149 However, the claimant would
still then have to show that the claimant met the three Penn Central

146. Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 187–88 (1928) (“[A] court should not set
aside the determination of public officers unless it is clear that their action ‘has no foundation in
reason and is a mere arbitrary or irrational exercise of power having no substantial relation to the
public health, the public morals, the public safety or the public welfare in its proper sense.’”
(quoting Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926))).
147. See Cnty. of Butler v. Wolf, No. 2:20-cv-677, 2020 WL 5510690, at *26 (W.D. Pa.
Sept. 14, 2020) (finding that the government’s orders closing all “non-life-sustaining” businesses
were arbitrary in creation, scope, and administration—and therefore in violation of substantive due
process). According to the Butler court, “the right of citizens to support themselves by engaging in
a chosen occupation is deeply rooted in our nation’s legal and cultural history and has long been
recognized as a component of the liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at *25.
148. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 529 (2005).
149. Unless the claim relates to a fundamental right or to, inter alia, a suspect class. Although
a discussion of every potential constitutional right affected is beyond the scope of this Article, other
claims that the stay-at-home orders are unconstitutional center on First Amendment rights of
expression and association and free exercise of religion as well as civil liberties and privacy. See,
e.g., Three Southern California Churches Sue Gov. Newsom Over Coronavirus Orders, L.A. TIMES
(Apr. 13, 2020, 7:59 PM), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-04-13/three-southerncalifornia-churches-sue-gov-newsom-over-coronavirus-orders (“[The] churches . . . argu[ed] that
social distancing orders violate the 1st Amendment right to freedom of religion and assembly.”);
Kiah Collier et al., Despite Coronavirus Risks, Some Texas Religious Groups Are Worshipping in
Person—With the Governor’s Blessing, TEX. TRIB. (Apr. 2, 2020, 5:00 PM),
https://www.texastribune.org/2020/04/02/texas-churches-coronavirus-stay-open/ (“Texas is far
from the only state to deem religious services essential; more than a dozen others have done so,
according to the National Governors Association.”). In Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn New
York v. Cuomo, the U.S. Supreme Court granted a church’s application for an injunction because
restrictions to church attendance were “not ‘neutral’ and of ‘general applicability’”—such
restrictions “must satisfy ‘strict scrutiny,’ and this means they must be ‘narrowly tailored’ to serve
a ‘compelling state interest.’” Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 67
(2020) (quoting Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546
(1993)).
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factors to be compensated for a Fifth Amendment taking. A Lucasstyle total deprivation claim is likely precluded by Tahoe Sierra.150
Proving such a claim is, in general, going to be wildly unlikely.151
There is, however, a narrow precedent for striking down regulations
that fail to advance health and safety laws. In Nectow v. City of
Cambridge,152 the U.S. Supreme Court examined a zoning regulation
in terms of the advancement of police powers of the health, safety, and
general welfare of the inhabitants of the City of Cambridge,
Massachusetts.153 Nectow was a due process claim case wherein the
property owner argued that a zoning regulation, as applied, “deprived
him of his property without due process of law in contravention of the
Fourteenth Amendment.”154 The City of Cambridge had zoned part of
Nectow’s property as residential, but a special master found that the
zoning would not promote the “health, safety, convenience, and
general welfare of . . . that part of the . . . city,”155 because the
surrounding properties were put to industrial and railroad purposes
and there “would not be adequate return on the . . . investment for the
development of the property.”156 The zoning regulation was struck
down.157
Nectow is important because it finds that a zoning regulation, as
applied, failed to advance health and safety regulations and was
therefore struck down under the Fourteenth Amendment. However, in
determining whether an executive decision is arbitrary and capricious,
courts generally set an exceedingly high standard—behavior must
“shock the conscience” or constitute the “most egregious official
conduct.”158 This standard will be extraordinarily—but not
150. Friends of Danny DeVito v. Wolf, 227 A.3d 872, 895 (Pa. 2020); see also Nat’l
Amusements Inc. v. Borough of Palmyra, 716 F.3d 57 (3d Cir. 2013) (finding no Fifth Amendment
taking under Tahoe Sierra for a five-month shutdown of an open-air flea market because of safety
concerns related to unexploded munitions from a weapons testing facility).
151. See generally Joseph D. Richards & Alyssa A. Ruge, Most Unlikely to Succeed:
Substantive Due Process Claims Against Local Governments Applying Land Use Restrictions, 78
FLA. BAR J. 34 (2004) (discussing why substantive due process claims against local governments
applying land use restrictions are typically very unlikely to succeed).
152. 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
153. Id. at 184.
154. Id. at 185.
155. Id. at 187 (citation omitted).
156. Id. (citation omitted).
157. Id. at 188–89.
158. Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998); Nestor Colon Medina &
Sucesores, Inc. v. Custodio, 964 F.2d 32, 45 (1st Cir. 1992) (noting that the “shocks the conscience”
standard “[leaves] the door slightly ajar for federal relief [only] in truly horrendous situations”).
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impossibly—difficult to meet in the coronavirus global pandemic
government shutdown context. Shutting down restaurants and hair
salons, for example, has a direct correlation to promoting social
distancing, which is critical to stop the spread of disease.159 A
substantive due process claim is therefore unlikely to be successful in
the coronavirus government shutdown context.
Similarly, there is little hope for petitioners alleging a procedural
due process violation. Generally, before a property right is taken, one
must be given notice and an opportunity to be heard before a neutral
decisionmaker.160 However, “where the State acts to abate an
emergent threat to public safety, postdeprivation process satisfies the
Constitution’s procedural due process requirement.”161 A petitioner
would likely have to show there is no relationship between the
prohibited activity and the harm sought to be remedied. Further, the
general right to do business is not recognized as a constitutionally
protected property right that is subject to due process protection.162
Some aggrieved plaintiffs have also sought to have coronavirus
shutdown orders overturned on Equal Protection grounds. “The Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no
State shall ‘deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws,’ which is essentially a direction that all persons similarly
situated should be treated alike.”163 Plaintiffs must show disparate
treatment was based on “impermissible considerations such as race,
religion, intent to inhibit or punish the exercise of constitutional rights,
or malicious or bad faith intent to injure a person.”164
In Lebanon Valley Auto Racing Corp. v. Cuomo,165 the plaintiffs
sought to invoke the Equal Protection Clause by showing disparate
treatment by comparing the government’s treatment of crowds
attending racetrack events (denied) to crowds attending
159. See Achenbach, supra note 40.
160. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348–49 (1976).
161. RBIII, L.P. v. City of San Antonio, 713 F.3d 840, 844 (5th Cir. 2013); see also Gilbert v.
Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 930 (1997) (“[W]here a State must act quickly, or where it would be
impractical to provide predeprivation process, postdeprivation process satisfies the requirements of
the Due Process Clause.”).
162. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 675
(1999).
163. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr. Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (quoting Plyler v.
Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)).
164. Harlen Assocs. v. Inc. Village of Mineola, 273 F.3d 494, 499 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting
LaTrieste Rest. & Cabaret v. Vill. of Port Chester, 40 F.3d 587, 590 (2d Cir. 1994)).
165. 478 F. Supp. 389 (N.D.N.Y. 2020).
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demonstrations and riots (permitted).166 Their appeal for an injunction,
however, was denied because there must be specific facts to show
“that the comparators are ‘similar in relevant respects.’”167 According
to the court, there was insufficient equivalence between private,
capacity-limited venues on one hand and attendees of public protests
on the other.168
Finally, government orders to shut down thriving businesses may
have been enacted without the requisite constitutional authority. In
Wisconsin Legislature v. Palm,169 the Wisconsin Supreme Court
struck down an order issued by the state Department of Health
Services (DHS) that required closure of all non-essential
businesses.170 The court found that in enacting the order, the
Wisconsin DHS was required to follow statutory rule-making
procedures and failed to do so, and therefore, the penalties for
noncompliance were invalid;171 and that the DHS exceeded its
authority under the applicable health regulations.172
V. THE CORONAVIRUS PANDEMIC AND GOVERNMENT ACTION
The government’s forced shutdown of otherwise thriving
businesses helped control the pandemic and stemmed an otherwisecatastrophic loss of life.173
Most states enacted sweeping shutdown and shelter-in-place
regulations that limited commerce and outdoor activities. In
Pennsylvania, for example, after declaring a disaster emergency
Governor Wolf issued an executive order on March 19, 2020, closing
all businesses that were not life-sustaining.174 Restaurants and bars
were singled out for closure, although permitted to offer carry out,

166. Id. at 399.
167. Id. at 398 (quoting Lilakos v. New York City, 808 Fed. App’x. 4, 8 (2d Cir. 2020)).
168. Id. But see Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, 140 S. Ct. 2603, 2608–10 (2020)
(Alito, J., dissenting) (arguing that allowing casino to operate in Nevada while prohibiting church
gatherings constituted unlawfully disparate treatment).
169. 942 N.W.2d 900 (Wis. 2020).
170. Id. at 906, 918 (ordering, inter alia, “‘[a]ll for-profit and non-profit businesses’ to ‘cease
all activities’ except for minimum operations that Palm deemed basic”).
171. Id. at 918.
172. See id. (“We further conclude that Palm’s order confining all people to their homes,
forbidding travel and closing businesses exceeded the statutory authority of Wis. Stat. § 252.02,
upon which Palm claims to rely.”).
173. See Achenbach, supra note 40.
174. Friends of Danny DeVito v. Wolf, 227 A.3d 872, 876–77 (Pa. 2020).
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drive through, and delivery business.175 These businesses were closed
expressly to “prevent the spread of COVID-19 by limiting person-toperson interactions through social distancing.”176
In Washington, Governor Inslee similarly directed all residents to
stay at home “except as needed to maintain continuity of operations of
essential critical infrastructure sectors and additional sectors as the
State Public Health Officer may designate as critical to protect health
and well-being of all Washingtonians,” shutting down all nonessential businesses, including restaurants and bars, who were
permitted to do take-out business.177
In California, Governor Newsom declared a State of Emergency
on March 4, 2020.178 On March 19, 2020, he “order[ed] all individuals
living in the State of California to stay home or at their place of
residence except as needed to maintain continuity of operations of the
federal critical infrastructure sectors.”179 Governor Newsom’s Order
singled out for closure: dine-in restaurants, bars and nightclubs,
entertainment venues, gyms and fitness studios, public events and
gatherings, convention centers, and hair and nail salons.180 The order
also listed a number of approved outdoor activities.181 In late August,
the Governor unveiled a new plan to implement phased re-openings
on a county-by-county basis. 182

175. Id. at 879. The Governor took steps to ensure that similarly situated entities would be
treated the same by employing a federal classification system of business sectors.
176. Id. at 880.
177. Proclamation, Stay at Home—Stay Healthy, Proclamation 20-25 by Wash. Governor Jay
Inslee app. at 1 (Mar. 23, 2020), https://www.governor.wa.gov/sites/default/files/WA%20Essenti
al%20Critical%20Infrastructure%20Workers%20%28Final%29.pdf.
178. Proclamation of a State of Emergency by Cal. Governor Gavin Newsom (Mar. 4, 2020),
https://www.gov.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/3.4.20-Coronavirus-SOE-Proclamation.pdf.
179. Cal. Exec. Order, Executive Order N-33-20 by Cal. Governor Gavin Newsom (Mar. 19,
2020), https://covid19.ca.gov/img/Executive-Order-N-33-20.pdf.
180. Mary Blyth Jones, Gavin Issues Stay-At-Home Orders for Entire State, COALINGA PRESS
(Mar. 19, 2020), https://coalingapress.org/2020/03/19/executive-order-n-33-20/.
181. See, e.g., Alix Martichoux, California Shelter-in-Place: State Issues Weirdly Specific List
of Allowed Outdoor Activities, ABC 7 NEWS (May 1, 2020), https://abc7news.com/california-listof-outdoor-activities-is-tennis-allowed-in-may-near-me/6143855/.
182. See Alexei Koseff & Catherine Ho, California’s New Rule for Coronavirus Reopenings:
It’s Not All or Nothing, S.F. CHRON. (Aug. 31, 2020, 11:10 AM), https://www.sfchronicle.com/p
olitics/article/California-s-new-rules-for-coronavirus-15522578.php (“Under the plan, unveiled
[Aug. 28, 2020] by Gov. Gavin Newsom, counties will be placed into four color-coded tiers—
purple, red, orange and yellow, in descending order of severity—based on the prevalence of the
coronavirus in their communities and gradually move through those levels. Restrictions on business
and public life will be eased as transmission drops.”).
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In hard-hit New York, Governor Cuomo issued a “New York
State on Pause” order on March 20, 2020.183 All non-essential
businesses were closed, and any non-essential gatherings of any size
for any reason were cancelled or postponed.184
Some steps were taken to mitigate the harm to hard-hit
businesses, with mixed success. Congress passed the Coronavirus Aid,
Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act,185 which, inter alia,
provided direct payment to individuals, extended unemployment
benefits, allowed employers to delay paying some taxes, eased
retirement fund restrictions, and paused student loan interest.186 The
CARES Act also provided $350 billion to prevent layoffs and small
business closures during the coronavirus pandemic shutdown.187 The
small business administration enacted the “paycheck protection
program”—a sweeping forgivable loan program for small
businesses.188
Many jurisdictions enacted legislation prohibiting evictions for
both residential and commercial tenants.189 However, even in states
183. Ryan W. Miller & Marco della Cava, Coronavirus Updates: U.S. Infections Approach
20,000; NY, Illinois Unleash Strict Rules; 150 Detroit Cops Quarantined, USA TODAY (Mar. 20,
2020, 5:36 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/health/2020/03/20/coronavirus-updatesus-deaths-cases-stay-home-order-trump/2880695001/.
184. See N.Y. Exec. Order, Executive Order 202.28, Continuing Temporary Suspension and
Modification of Laws Relating to the Disaster Emergency, by N.Y. Governor Andrew Cuomo
(Mar. 20, 2020), https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/no-20228-continuing-temporary-suspensionand-modification-laws-relating-disaster-emergency.
185. Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281
(2020).
186. Leon LaBrecque, The CARES Act Has Passed: Here Are the Highlights, FORBES (Mar. 29,
2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/leonlabrecque/2020/03/29/the-cares-act-haspassed-here-are-the-highlights/#67757e8768cd; Zack Friedman, Your Student Loans Are Due
January 1, FORBES (Nov. 10, 2020, 2:45 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/zackfriedman/2020/
11/10/your-student-loans-are-due-january-1-here-are-5-potential-scenarios/?sh=597a56423ec3.
187. LaBrecque, supra note 186.
188. See Andy Puzder, Despite the Rocky Publicity, the Small-Business Loan Program Is Really
Working, WASH. POST (Apr. 30, 2020, 2:38 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/des
pite-the-rocky-publicity-the-small-business-loan-program-is-reallyworking/2020/04/30/970357ce-8b0e-11ea-9dfd-990f9dcc71fc_story.html (“On April 3, the Small
Business Administration launched the PPP with $349 billion. The SBA’s most recent report says
that through April 16, the agency approved nearly 1.7 million loans through 4,975 lenders,
depleting the entire fund.”). The Trump Administration also limited evictions for residential
tenants. Kelly Anne Smith & Lisa Rowan, Trump’s Eviction Moratorium Aims to Protect Renters,
but Evictions Continue, FORBES (Sept. 14, 2020, 4:54 PM), https://www.forbes.com/advisor/pers
onal-finance/trumps-eviction-moratorium-aims-to-protect-renters-but-evictions-continue/.
189. See Fact Sheet, COVID-19 Relief Programs for Businesses and Employers, by Paul,
Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison, LLP (Aug. 31, 2020), https://www.paulweiss.com/media/3
979787/covid-19-relief-programs-for-businesses-and-employers.pdf; Dan Keating & Lauren
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that limited evictions, many renters still face eviction, and the eviction
prohibitions are time limited, which may be little help to many small
businesses who were shut during the pandemic.190
VI. MOVING FORWARD: ADVANCING DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND THE
ARMSTRONG PRINCIPLE
Takings law is woefully inadequate to compensate individuals
who were harmed by the various government shutdowns during the
coronavirus pandemic—particularly those whose businesses will have
to close permanently due to the shutdown because they are in a
particular class of enterprise that concerns gatherings or close contact,
like hair salons and dine-in restaurants. The plain language of the Fifth
Amendment Takings Clause (“nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation”191)—and the admonition in
Armstrong: “The Fifth Amendment’s guarantee that private property
shall not be taken for a public use without just compensation was
designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by
the public as a whole”192—should militate in favor of relief for these
disproportionately affected individuals and businesses.
The Armstrong Principle is rooted in fundamental historic notions
of fairness and justice.193 This is a central concern of moral
philosophy—“when do the needs of the many outweigh the needs of
the few?“194 For Aristotle in particular, this was “distributive justice”
Tierney, Which States Are Doing a Better Job Protecting Renters from Being Evicted During the
Coronavirus Pandemic, WASH. POST (Apr. 29, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2
020/04/29/which-states-are-doing-better-job-protecting-renters-being-evicted-during-coronaviruspandemic/?arc404=true; see also Matthew Haag & Conor Dougherty, #CancelRent Is New Rallying
Cry for Tenants. Landlords Are Alarmed., N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/05/01/nyregion/rent-strike-coronavirus.html. But see Emily L. Mahoney, Home Renters
Can’t Get Evicted in Florida, but Small Businesses Can, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Apr. 8, 2020),
https://www.tampabay.com/news/business/2020/04/08/home-renters-cant-get-evicted-in-floridabut-small-businesses-can/ (“Florida’s statewide moratorium on evictions doesn’t include
businesses. Gov. Ron DeSantis’ order, issued April 2, states that he is suspending the law for
evictions ‘solely as it relates to non-payment of rent by residential tenants due to the COVID-19
emergency.’ The suspension lasts for 45 days.”).
190. Keating & Tierney, supra note 189.
191. U.S. CONST. amend V.
192. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
193. Jeffrey M. Gaba, Taking “Justice and Fairness” Seriously: Distributive Justice and the
Takings Clause, 40 CREIGHTON L. REV. 569, 570 (2007).
194. Id. (stating that the issue has “captured the attention of philosophers from Aristotle to Star
Trek’s Mr. Spock”) (citing STAR TREK II: THE WRATH OF KHAN (Paramount Pictures 1982)).
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or the “ethical analysis of the distribution of benefits and burdens in
society.”195 “[D]istributive justice” is the restoration of proportionate
equality.196 Goods that determine one’s fortune—like money to pay
rent and employees—that are in limited supply should be distributed
equally.197 In Aristotle’s words: “[Distributive] justice . . . is that
which is manifested in distributions of honor or money or the other
things that fall to be divided among those who have a share in the
constitution [civil society] . . . .”198 Aristotle scholars have further
explained that:
The practical effects of distributive justice are considered to
be social solidarity and social stability. Hence, society
allocates goods according to that social rule that best
effectuates the basic purposes of the polity. In this sense,
Aristotle’s conception of distributive justice would be
welfare maximizing. The definitive test of a “just” allocative
rule is that its resulting allocations are proportionate to a
primary social value.199
In this regard, forcing segments of society—like restaurants and
bars—to shoulder the burdens of society interferes with social stability
and fails to effectuate the best interests of society.
Applying Aristotle’s notion of “distributive justice” (and the
Armstrong Principle) is notoriously difficult generally, but
particularly so in the coronavirus shutdown of small business context.
Courts are ill suited to determine the complex notions of which groups
195. Id. (“In Aristotelian terms, this is the issue of ‘distributive justice’ or the ethical analysis
of the distribution of benefits and burdens in society.”).
196. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. IV, at ch. 4 (William David Ross trans., Oxford,
The Clarendon Press 1908) (c. 384 B.C.E.) (ebook); cf. James E. Krier & Christopher Serkin, Public
Ruses, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 859, 859(arguing that justice would be served through increased
compensation in eminent domain cases when there is little evidence of public use).
197. See Dana Neaçsu, A Brief Critique of the Emaciated State and Its Reliance on NonGovernmental Organizations to Provide Social Services, 9 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 405, 418 (2006);
Kathryn Heidt, Corrective Justice from Aristotle to Second Order Liability: Who Should Pay When
the Culpable Cannot?, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 347, 351 (1990) (“The aim of distributive justice
is to establish or provide a method of establishing a proportion according to which the members of
society will share so that the most deserving will be entitled to the most, and the least deserving to
the least.”).
198. ARISTOTLE, supra note 196, bk. V, at ch. 2; cf. Judith A. Swanson, Michael J. Sandel’s
Justice: What’s the Right Thing to Do? A Response of Moral Reasoning in Kind, With Analysis of
Aristotle and Examples, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1375, 1385 (2011) (“As Aristotle says, doing the right
thing requires doing it at the right time, in the right way, to the right people . . . .”).
199. Elbert L. Robertson, A Corrective Justice Theory of Antitrust Regulation, CATH. U. L.
REV. 741, 743–44 (2000).
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should pay a “fair share” or “equal distribution” in fighting the
coronavirus.200 The government shutdown during the coronavirus
pandemic unquestionably represents an exercise of the government’s
police power to regulate the health, safety, and welfare of the
community. But the three-part Penn Central Test does not adequately
account for equal distribution of burdens.
Yet the Armstrong Principle is the ostensible impetus for the
three-part Penn Central Test:
The question of what constitutes a “taking” for purposes of
the Fifth Amendment has proved to be a problem of
considerable difficulty. While this Court has recognized that
the “Fifth Amendment’s guarantee . . . [is] designed to bar
Government from forcing some people alone to bear public
burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne
by the public as a whole,” [citing Armstrong], this Court,
quite simply, has been unable to develop any “set formula”
for determining when “justice and fairness” require that
economic injuries caused by public action be compensated
by the government, rather than remain disproportionately
concentrated on a few persons [citing Goldblatt]. Indeed, we
have frequently observed that whether a particular restriction
will be rendered invalid by the government’s failure to pay
for any losses proximately caused by it depends largely
“upon the particular circumstances [in that] case.
In engaging in these essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries, the
Court’s decisions have identified several factors that have
particular significance. The economic impact of the
regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to
which the regulation has interfered with distinct investmentbacked expectations are, of course, relevant considerations.
So, too, is the character of the governmental action. A
200. See Huntington Beach City Council v. Superior Ct., 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 439, 452 (Ct. App.
2002) (“You can get a Ph.D. in political science studying what ‘fair shares’ are and still not come
to any firm conclusion. The subject has occupied political philosophers since at least Aristotle,
who, in addressing the subject of ‘distributive justice,’ began a long tradition in political philosophy
of thinking about exactly what do you mean by ‘fair’ in ‘fair share.’ It is one of those topics that is
particularly suited for the marketplace of ideas.”); see also Gaba, supra note 193, at 575 (“[T]he
Supreme Court has never seriously explored the implications of viewing the Takings Clause in
terms of distributive justice. Indeed, the Court seems to have shied away from any serious
analysis.”).
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“taking” may more readily be found when the interference
with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by
government, than when interference arises from some public
program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life
to promote the common good.201
Any “set formula”202 for determining whether “justice and fairness”
dictate that a business owner should be compensated because their
property has been “taken” should include an express recitation of the
Armstrong Principle as a determinative fourth Penn Central factor
when one group has been called upon to bear burdens that should be
borne by society as a whole.203 As a practical matter, the Armstrong
Principle is repeatedly cited by courts, but is practically never a
determinative factor in deciding whether, for example, a Fifth
Amendment taking has occurred.204 It should be.205 The coronavirus
201. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123–24 (1978) (first and fourth
alterations in original) (emphasis added) (citations omitted); cf. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505
U.S. 1003, 1071 (Stevens, J. dissenting) (“[T]he determination whether a law effects a taking is
ultimately a matter of ‘fairness and justice,’ [citing Armstrong] and ‘necessarily requires a weighing
of private and public interests’ [citing Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 261 (1980)]. The
rigid rules fixed by the Court today clash with this enterprise: ‘fairness and justice’ are often
disserved by categorical rules.”).
202. Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. at 124. Although Penn Central refers to a “set formula,” “no
magic formula enables a court to judge, in every case, whether a given government interference
with property is a taking.” Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 568 U.S. 23, 31 (2012).
203. See contra Michael Pappas, The Armstrong Revolution, 76 MD. L. REV. ENDNOTES 35, 45
(2016) (stating that the Armstrong Principle “cannot serve as a meaningful test to determine
whether property has been taken”). According to Pappas, “the inquiry as to whether a taking has,
in fact, occurred should incorporate no comparative fairness question. It should merely ask whether
regulation has gone too far in reducing property expectations.” Id.
204. See id. at 43–44 ([A]n analysis of all citations to the Armstrong principle in lower federal
courts and state courts indicates the same result: that the Armstrong principle is oft-cited but never
the ultimate grounds for resolving a case. These cases citing Armstrong tend to fall into one of four
categories. First, some cases simply cite and repeat the Armstrong principle, usually as a general
tenet of takings law. Second, some cases cite the Armstrong principle as a component of one of the
factors in the Penn Central balancing test or cite Armstrong as an addition after applying an
individualist takings measure. Third, some cases cite Armstrong in reliance on its narrow holding
to support the assertion that liens or comparable types of property amount to property interests for
the purposes of the takings clause. Finally, a fourth set of cases cites Armstrong for the general
propositions that the destruction or seizure of valuable property can amount to a taking but that not
every government action affecting property is necessarily a taking. There are also cases that fall
outside of these categories, but, again, none applies Armstrong as the primary (or even major)
source of reasoning or decision in a case. Of all these cases, none of them offers a robust or even
meaningful application of the Armstrong principle as a test for whether a taking has occurred.); cf.
Stephen Durden, Unprincipled Principles: The Takings Clause Exemplar, 3 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L.
REV. 25, 45 (2013) (stating that the Supreme Court embraces Armstrong “at least occasionally”).
205. “[T]he Supreme Court has never seriously explored the implications of viewing the
Takings Clause in terms of distributive justice.” Gaba, supra note 193, at 575. Rather, “the Court
seems to have shied away from any serious analysis,” and continues to “resort[] to the same ad hoc
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shutdowns have exposed a glaring inadequacy in the way takings
claims are evaluated.
Employing the new and expanded test will not, by any means,
open the floodgates of compensation for aggrieved property and
business owners, nor unfortunately, will it directly help those who
have lost their jobs due to the coronavirus pandemic shutdown. It may
extend the possibility of a decision that considers distributive justice
in determining whether a property interest has been “taken,” in
instances where there is a glaring inequity in distributive justice.206
This is particularly true, in the “category of cases in which . . . .
unanticipated regulations destroy a significant portion of the total
assets of a property owner.”207 In many situations, the coronavirus
pandemic government shutdown of small businesses that depend on
“social distancing” is just such a category of cases.
Expanding takings law by adding a determinative factor to the
Penn Central Test for unexpected catastrophic regulations will better
allow those affected to be heard. The static three-part Penn Central
Test does not achieve this goal because it does not expressly balance
societal interests. Since the Penn Central Test represents the
touchstone of nearly all takings analyses, courts would be better
equipped to make just decisions with an expanded and flexible test—
as was originally contemplated in Penn Central. 208 This is particularly
true in the context of the additional burden created by the temporary
takings analysis. Petitioners have the high hurdle of showing that a
balancing.” Id. (noting how, in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, the Supreme Court merely stated that
the outcome “depends largely ‘upon the particular circumstances’” of the case).
206. See, e.g., id. at 590 (arguing that the U.S. Supreme Court would have reached a different
result in Miller v. Schoene if the Court had considered “fairness” in deciding whether a taking had
occurred (citing Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 280–81 (1928))). Of course, Miller was decided
decades before both Armstrong and Penn Central.
207. William Michael Treanor, The Armstrong Principle, the Narrative of Takings, and
Compensation Statutes, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1151, 1155 (1997). Treanor persuasively argues
that compensation in cases where “the total net worth of a property owner is dealt a disproportionate
blow as a result of a newly instituted government regulation.” Id. at 1156; cf. Sanitation &
Recycling Indus. Inc. v. City of New York, 107 F.3d 985, 993 (2d Cir. 1997) (“Impairment is
greatest where the challenged government legislation was wholly unexpected.”).
208. Cf. Nestor M. Davidson, The Problem of Equality in Takings, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 6–8
(2008) (“There is a strong meta-signal in the Court’s endorsement of Penn Central as the lodestar
of regulatory takings jurisprudence, with its concomitant rejection of rule-based limits on the
government’s ability to redefine property rights. Privileging ad hoc, open-ended analysis commits
the Court—to the consternation of some commentators—to unfolding the doctrine in a pragmatic
common law manner. The Court’s embrace of Justice Brennan’s jurisprudential shrug of the
shoulders in Penn Central does not quite amount to Justice Stewart’s famous I-know-it-when-Isee-it standard, but it certainly comes close.”).
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law is arbitrary or otherwise interfered with a fundamental right—or
having government end a regulation after a taking has occurred—then
would have to meet the Penn Central Test to obtain “just
compensation” for a taking.209 There should be an exception to this
procedure in the highly unusual situation of when there is a
disproportionately applied, unanticipated and sudden catastrophic
change in the law that destroys nearly all of a property owner’s
holdings—like during a global pandemic and the ensuing “social
distancing” regulations.
Under current law, it is highly unlikely that a petitioner would be
able to get around the health and safety exceptions and/or prove that
the coronavirus government shutdown regulation was otherwise
invalid, or ended after a taking occurred (effecting a temporary
taking), but if so, an aggrieved party may still have a viable Penn
Central argument.210 Under Penn Central, the petitioner would first
have to show interference with reasonable investment-backed
expectations. Here, many impacted businesses certainly expected to
be able to continue their businesses in March and April of 2020
without their governors closing their doors due to a global
pandemic.211 There is a demonstrable interference with investment
backed expectations. Next, the petitioner would have to show a
diminution in value. Again, this should not be a problem. Appraisers
can quantify the losses from a business closure or other loss
occasioned by the government shutdown.212 The character of the
209. In such a case, a petitioner might also have a right to compensation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(2012) (civil action for deprivation of rights). Section 1983 gives individuals the right to sue state
actors for civil rights or other constitutional violations, including impairment of contract. Id.
210. But see Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421–23, 441
(1982) (holding that a New York state law preventing landlords from collecting fees for cable
installations on their properties was a taking under the Fifth Amendment).
211. See, e.g., TJM 64, Inc. v. Harris, 475 F. Supp. 3d 828, 837–38 (W.D. Tenn. 2020). In TJM
64, a federal district court considered whether to grant an injunction and weighed the Penn Central
factors in determining whether the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their claim.
The court found that the “[COVID-19 closure Orders] interfere in a significant way with Plaintiffs’
investment-backed expectations in their properties, despite their status as highly regulated entities.”
Id. at 839. The court also found a diminution in value, but ultimately denied the plaintiffs’ motion
based on Penn Central’s character of the government action test. Id.; see also Elmsford Apt.
Assocs., LLC v. Cuomo, 469 F. Supp. 3d 348, at 155 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (denying a motion for
summary judgment challenging New York’s temporary ban on eviction proceedings under, inter
alia, a takings theory). Under Elmsford, the court found that the petitioners could not reasonably
expect to be free of additional rental regulations like the eviction ban. Id. at 168–69. The court also
found that the character of the government action prong weighed in favor of the defendant because
it was a temporary reallocation of resources. Id. at 167–68.
212. See, e.g., Elmsford., 469 F. Supp. 3d at 166–68.
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government action may be a problem when a shutdown is due to health
and safety concerns,213 but the actual action—and how it relates to
those burdens—will depend on the circumstances of the case. Finally,
petitioner should be able to show that they have been singled out to
bear a burden that should be borne as a whole—depending on the size
of the affected population.
In the case of an unanticipated regulation that destroys a
significant portion of a property owner’s assets—and the petitioner
carries a disproportionate burden—there should be a more colorable
Fifth Amendment takings argument—even if the regulation is
temporarily related to a health and safety violation. This should be a
high bar for unprecedented situations that single out particular types
of property owners, whose interests are devastated by the
unanticipated regulation,214 and whose burdens are disproportionate to
the rest of society. The principles of distributive justice call for no less.
Therefore, despite the unquestionably compelling safety and health
concerns militating in favor of shutting down businesses that center
upon social distancing, these industries should not be forced to bear
the brunt of society’s burdens, while other industries flourish215 during
the coronavirus pandemic.
This raises the question of where to draw the line in determining
whether one group is called upon to sacrifice for the greater good.
Distributive justice cannot be absolute in this context. Armstrong’s
reflection of the principle of distributive justice is clear (as is the plain
language of the Fifth Amendment), yet the U.S. Supreme Court has
213. Id. at 167–69. See Lebanon Valley Auto Racing Corp. v. Cuomo, 478 F. Supp. 3d 389,
402 (N.D.N.Y. 2020) (“[W]ith respect to the third factor—the character of the government action—
the Court begins by noting its power to outweigh the other two.”).
214. See Gaba, supra note 193, at 586–87. Professor Gaba posits an “insurance theory” of
sharing the risk to minimize loss in a takings context. According to Professor Gaba, “insurance is
appropriately employed only to avoid catastrophic loss from unusual and unpredictable events.
Insurance theory indicates that we should not buy insurance to cover relatively small losses that
arise from regular and expected events; it is economically more rational to bear such losses
ourselves.” Id.
215. See Big Tech’s Covid-19 Opportunity, THE ECONOMIST (Apr. 4, 2020)
https://www.economist.com/leaders/2020/04/04/big-techs-covid-19-opportunity (“The pandemic
will have many losers, but it already has one clear winner: big tech. The large digital platforms,
including Alphabet and Facebook, will come out of the crisis even stronger. They should use this
good fortune to reset their sometimes testy relations with their users. Otherwise big government,
the other beneficiary of the covid calamity, is likely to do it for them.”); Jeremy Kress, Big Banks
Are Growing Due to the Coronavirus—That’s an Ominous Sign, THE HILL (May 1, 2020, 7:30
PM), https://thehill.com/opinion/finance/495719-big-banks-are-growing-due-to-coronavirusthats-an-ominous-sign.
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justifiably limited just compensation in areas where the government
exercises its police power to protect the health safety and welfare of
its residents. According to Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes,
“[g]overnment hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to
property could not be diminished without paying for every such
change in the general law.”216 The population, therefore, of affected
individuals entitled to compensation cannot be so large that it
interferes with government’s ability to go on.
Permitting widespread takings for coronavirus pandemic
shutdowns may also incentivize businesses to engage in risky behavior
by remaining open to get shut down by the government and
subsequently receive compensation. Even if this strategy were
successful, the government would still retain the ability to shut down
businesses, it would just have to pay “just compensation” for doing
so.217 This is, after all, the touchstone of the Fifth Amendment’s plain
language.
Zoning changes, and health and safety regulations practically
always affect one’s use of property and therefore reduce the value of
property.218 There is also no question that the government shutdown
to avert a global pandemic represents a legitimate—even a
compelling—public interest. The critical question in determining
compensation lies in “distributive justice,” which should be reflected
in an overriding—and determinative—factor in the Penn Central
Test219 in cases where regulations are disproportionately applied,
unanticipated, catastrophic, and sudden—and “destroy a significant
portion of the [property owner’s assets].”220 This approach is
consistent with Armstrong and the ostensible impetus for the Penn
Central Test itself.

216. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
217. See Ilya Somin, Does the Takings Clause Require Compensation for Coronavirus
Shutdowns?, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Mar. 20, 2020, 10:20 PM), https://reason.com/2020/03/20/d
oes-the-takings-clause-require-compensation-for-coronavirus-shutdowns/.
218. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 334–
35 (2002) (“[A deprivation of all economic use cannot always be a taking because it] would apply
to numerous ‘normal delays in obtaining building permits, changes in zoning ordinance, variances
and the like’ . . . as well as to orders temporarily prohibiting access to crime scenes, businesses that
violate health codes, fire damaged buildings or other areas we cannot foresee.”).
219. Cf. Treanor, supra note 207, at 1155 (stating that cases in which “unanticipated regulations
destroy a significant portion of the total assets of a property owner” require compensation under
the Armstrong Principle).
220. Id.
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Therefore, there should be two exceptions to this test: (1) when
the subject regulation is mitigating a harm caused by the property
itself; and (2) when the population of similarly affected parties is too
large to constitute a legitimate claim of being “singled out” for
carrying a burden that should be shouldered by society as a whole.
First, there should be no taking for a property that is directly
causing a situation that calls for a sudden and unanticipated regulation.
This exception is analogous to the “background principles” exception
in Lucas. According to Lucas:
[T]he owner of a lake-bed, for example, would not be entitled
to compensation when he is denied the requisite permit to
engage in a landfilling operation that would have the effect
of flooding others’ land. Nor the corporate owner of a
nuclear generating plant, when it is directed to remove all
improvements from its land upon discovery that the plant sits
astride an earthquake fault. Such regulatory action may well
have the effect of eliminating the land’s only economically
productive use, but it does not proscribe a productive use that
was previously permissible under relevant property and
nuisance principles.221
In this regard, properties that cause the harm that the sudden regulation
is enacted to protect is akin to a nuisance that does not otherwise
deserve protection222 because it is recognized as a harm to society. In
the coronavirus shutdown context, many petitioners have argued that
their offending regulations have little bearing on reducing the
transmission of disease. Such claimants should have an opportunity to
have their interests balanced in a takings test before a court.
Second, the population of affected parties entitled to
compensation from a sudden unanticipated and catastrophic regulation
that results in a near total loss of property must be identifiable,
sufficiently narrow, and with nearly similar impacts. To the extent that
a sudden, catastrophic and unexpected regulation wipes out too many
property owners’ values, the relief is no less just, but at that point,
Fifth Amendment takings law—and the Armstrong principle—are not
suited to provide compensation. At some point, the relief is legislative,

221. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029–30 (1992).
222. See Gaba, supra note 193, at 587–88 (discussing “blameworthiness” in assessing the
validity of a takings claim).
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not judicial, and appeals should be to legislators, not to judges.223
Florida, for example has a statute that mirrors the Armstrong principle.
Under the Bert J. Harris Private Property Rights Protection Act,
compensation is due for regulations that “inordinately burden, restrict,
or limit private property rights.”224 Under that law, a property is
inordinately burdened when a property owner “bears permanently a
disproportionate share of a burden imposed for the good of the public,
which in fairness should be borne by the public at large.”225 However,
an “inordinate burden” does not include temporary impacts, or
remediation of a public nuisance.226 Therefore, an aggrieved property
owner, whose business was shut down by a pandemic regulation
probably has no cause of action under this statute—but it’s a close
model of a legislative fix. The Florida legislature could, for example,
add a clause stating that temporary impacts may be considered for a
taking if the regulations are (1) disproportionately applied; (2)
catastrophic; and (3) unexpected.
Because of these necessary exceptions, the procedures outlined in
this Article will not likely dramatically change the landscape of Fifth
Amendment takings law. State and local governments still have
sweeping power to regulate for the public health, safety, and welfare.
The coronavirus pandemic shutdown is a valid exercise of that power.
The point rather is to focus the shift of the analysis to the benefits and
burdens of regulations that severely harm property interests that are
called upon to shoulder burdens that should be borne by society—in
situations involving a disproportionate, catastrophic and unexpected
loss. Takings law, as currently applied does not adequately reflect
distributive justice or the Armstrong Principle.
Another problem with this approach is that it does little to assist
front-line workers who have been hardest hit by pandemic-initiated
government shutdowns. Those individuals are shouldering
disproportionate burdens (job losses) while other segments of society
223. See, e.g., Treanor, supra note 207, at 1174 (suggesting a compensation statute that tracks,
in part, the Armstrong Principle). The North Carolina legislature proposed a bill that would amend
the state Constitution to allow a business to sue the government when partially or completely closed
by the Governor’s executive order. Richard Craver, N.C., House Bill Would Allow Business Owners
to Sue Over Shutdowns, WINSTON-SALEM J. (May 27, 2020) https://journalnow.com/news/state/nc-house-bill-would-allow-business-owners-to-sue-over-shutdowns/article_a2e16a14-2518-5ec29ef3-6264f82e0c19.html.
224. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 70.001 (LexisNexis 2021).
225. Id. § 70.001(e)(1).
226. Id. § 70.001(e)(1)–(2).
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are thriving. The Fifth Amendment takings analysis does little to make
these workers whole, although the expanded analysis suggested here,
taking into account the Armstrong Principle, may dissuade state and
local authorities from closing certain businesses in the first place
which may preserve jobs. Relief for workers and other segments of
society that have been disproportionately burdened otherwise lies with
state and federal legislatures.227
VII. CONCLUSION
The harm to many small businesses—and their employees—
during the coronavirus government shutdown was widespread, and
frequently catastrophic. Restaurants, gyms, retail, and the travel
industry were particularly devastated, and workers in these industries
may be the least financially able to weather the pandemic’s economic
storm.228
Unfortunately, absent a showing of arbitrary government action
or a physical invasion, those hardest hit will not be able to receive
compensation under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment,
despite the fact that their livelihood may have been taken (at least
temporarily) without just compensation from the government. This is
true despite the Supreme Court’s admonition in Armstrong and
Aristotle’s concept of distributive justice. Takings Clause
jurisprudence is therefore inadequate to fully compensate individuals
whose property has been “taken” without just compensation. Adding
a determinative factor to the Penn Central Test for situations that are
disproportionate, sudden, and catastrophic may help advance the
interests of those who are bearing more of a burden than should
justifiably be borne by society as a whole.

227. Affected workers may also have a narrow constitutional argument. According to the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals, “[t]he right to hold specific private employment and to follow a chosen
profession free from unreasonable governmental interference comes within both the ‘liberty’ and
the ‘property’ concepts of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.” Piecknick v. Pennsylvania, 36
F.3d 1250, 1259 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 492, (1959)). However,
“it is the liberty to pursue a calling or occupation, and not the right to a specific job, that is secured
by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. (citation omitted).
228. See, e.g., Grant Suneson, Industries Hit Hardest by Coronavirus in the US Include Retail,
Transportation, and Travel, USA TODAY (Mar. 20, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/s
tory/money/2020/03/20/us-industries-being-devastated-by-the-coronavirus-travel-hotelsfood/111431804/ (“[H]ourly workers in sectors like hospitality and retail may be let go as their
companies get less business. This further jeopardizes some of the least financially secure workers
in the country—jobs in these fields are often part-time and typically pay low wages.”).
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